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AbstractCultural contentiousness is defined as an attribute of innovation due to which it encounters resistance because of its incompatibility with hegemonic cultural assumptions. I argue that culturally contentious innovations are likely to be adopted when antecedents have productive symbolic force, i.e., they reveal contradictions between dominant cultural assumptions and the material outcomes of existing institutions or empower social actors to resolve such contradictions. However, antecedents with incapacitative symbolic force tend to obfuscate the above contradictions or decrease social actors' capacity to resolve them, encouraging the adoption of less contentious innovation. Applying these arguments to citizen oversight agencies (COAs) for the police, I examine the antecedents of contentious (i.e., investigative) as opposed to less contentious (non‐investigative) COAs. In support of the above argument, I find that productive antecedents (e.g., a consent decree, an increase in civil rights nonprofits) are associated with adopting investigative COAs. In contrast, incapacitative antecedents (e.g., a Law Enforcement Officer Bill of Rights, an increase in the violent crime rate) are associated with adopting non‐investigative COAs. The findings broadly demonstrate that policy adoption scholars ought to distinguish policies in terms of cultural contentiousness and account for the symbolic force of antecedents. Further theoretical contributions are discussed.

AbstractThis article examines the ability of social accountability to spur gradual institutional change at the municipal level, using the case of citizen oversight agencies (COAs) for police agencies. Using the gradual change framework and the social accountability framework to guide the empirical strategy and data collected through an original survey of COAs, the authors test the impact of COAs on institutional outcomes in policing. We find that, in accordance with the gradual change framework, the degree to which a COA reduces racial disparity in policing outcomes depends on its scope of authority and the degree of discretion afforded by existing institutions to police officers. In general, the wider the scope of authority, and the broader the discretion afforded by existing institutions, the greater the likelihood of change in institutional outcomes.

Despite being touted as a game-changing technology, studies on the influence of body-worn cameras (BWCs) on policing outcomes have produced mixed results, with the underlying reasons for such findings unclear. Drawing on the sociology of culture and organizational theory, we argue that BWCs often have mixed impacts due to deeply ingrained, valued occupational assumptions and practices shaped by the structural and organizational context. These assumptions and practices, collectively known as the police métier, are not politically neutral and can lead to motivated decisions rather than accurate ones. We suggest that such motivated reasoning can be mitigated by changing the structural or organizational context, such as establishing a citizen oversight agency (COA), which could decrease racial disparities in policing outcomes. To test these arguments, we examined the impact of BWCs on racial disparities in two types of policing outcomes: police homicides of citizens and disorderly conduct arrests (DCAs). Our findings indicate that while the adoption of BWCs does not impact racial disparities in DCAs or police homicides of citizens, there is a significant decrease in racial disparity in DCAs when BWCs and COAs are used in conjunction. Additionally, while the racial disparity in police homicides of Blacks and Whites does not decrease when BWCs and COAs are used together, there is an overall decrease in police homicides across both racial groups. Overall, our study demonstrates that technology's impact on bureaucratic performance is influenced by occupational assumptions and practices, which can be altered by external accountability mechanisms such as COAs.

The U.S. federal government often devolves administrative processes and decision making to state and local governments. Prior studies have found that the success of decentralization and implementation depends on several mediating factors at the subnational level, such as a state's political ideology or administrative capacity. This study focuses on one mechanism—the ability of states to leverage their information advantage about the local context vis-à-vis the federal government. We are interested in whether the information advantage of state-level firearm background checks decreased the rates of intimate partner violence (IPV) involving a firearm compared to states that relied on federally administered background checks. We take advantage of data from the period of state-mandated stay-at-home (SAH) orders during the COVID-19 pandemic, a temporal context with increased IPV rates. Using a Poisson fixed effects regression, we find that rates of IPV involving a firearm did not increase when the SAH orders were in effect. However, using decision-relevant information in state-administered background checks decreased the rates of IPV resulting in injury and murder-suicide, compared to states that relied on federal background checks.